A Glance at Women’s Political Representation and Decision-making in the EU and Central Asia
The political representation of women is a crucial aspect of gender equality and inclusive democratic governance. Although women’s political rights have been formally granted equality in many countries, their representation in political institutions is still unequal. It is important to distinguish between formal equality (legal rights and protections), and substantive political equality (actual participation and influence in political decision-making) (Krook, 2009, pp. 3–12, 21–28)
Gender quotas are one of the most popular approaches to increasing the number of women in the political sphere that have been studied. There are various forms of quotas, such as reserved seats, legislated quotas for candidates, and voluntary party quotas. Evidence indicates that the design and application of quotas can have an impact on the results. Quotas should not be considered as a single policy instrument, as their political implications differ based on electoral systems, political parties, their enforcement and the overall political climate. Likewise, Hughes et al. (2017) conclude that quotas can significantly boost the presence of females, though they have varying impacts on women’s representation in different institutional contexts and countries.
Studies of the countries in Europe reveal considerable variation regarding the level of political representation of women and in the use of quotas. The European countries that use legislation have quotas – while some use voluntary party quotas, others have managed to achieve a relatively high proportion of women in parliament without relying on compulsory quotas. Studies analyzed how legislative gender quotas were related to public support for higher women representation within 28 European countries and concluded that those countries with legislative gender quotas had higher levels of public support. This indicates that quotas can have impacts on what goes beyond the makeup of political institutions in terms of numbers. (Fernández & Valiente, 2021, pp. 361–367).
Nonetheless, numerical representation does not imply that women have equal influence on political decisions. The literature thus differentiates between descriptive representation (whether the institutions in power are composed of women or not) and substantive representation (whether women are represented in the institutions and whether women are represented by their own interests or not) (O’Brien & Piscopo, 2019, pp. 53–57). This separation has some significance in the context of evaluating the impact of gender quotas on democratic governance. More women in elected positions can be a positive development towards political inclusion, but it does not necessarily indicate equal opportunity for women to hold positions of influence or to be part of decision-making processes.
The literature on Central Asia is limited but raises similar issues about the relationship between formal reforms and women’s participation in politics. Political institutions, social norms, gender stereotypes, political networks, economic resources and implementation of reforms have been identified as playing an important role in women’s involvement in decision making across the region (UNDP, 2016, pp. 8–11). The case of Kyrgyzstan is especially relevant, as gender quotas have been implemented to boost the presence of women in politics. However, it has been argued that quotas alone do not necessarily lead to substantive political empowerment. (Zakharchenko, 2019, pp. 21–25)
The reasons for different outcomes in gender representation from similar institutional mechanisms are the focus of comparison between the EU and Central Asia. Both regions are far from monolithic. Indeed recent research indicates that cultural analysis for each country in addition to the impact of the design of quotas, electoral systems, political parties, enforcement and social circumstances is more appropriate. This method of analysing formal and substantive equality allows one to differentiate between formal processes that involve measures supporting women’s representation and their actual impact.
So far, the available evidence suggests that gender quotas may be an effective tool for tackling women’s political marginalization in the right institutional and social settings, yet they have been weaker elsewhere. The current research checked the gender quotas not only as formal legal mechanisms but also in terms of how they operate in practice. Comparative studies demonstrate that the existence of a statutory quota for political candidates does not by itself determine the level of women’s political representation. The practical effect of a quota depends on its design, the position of women on candidate lists, enforcement mechanisms, sanctions for non-compliance, and the broader political and social environment. One shall draw attention to the example of an EU state – Belgium.
Belgian experience, as an example, illustrates the importance of the design and implementation of gender quotas, highlighting their practical impact. In 1994, the country adopted legal gender quotas, which stipulated that candidates on electoral lists have to be at least 25% female. The early system, however, did not permit control over the placement of candidates on lists, so the parties were able to put a considerable number of women in non-electable or less desirable positions. Therefore, there was no immediate rise in the number of women elected to office as a result of the formal quota. Later, in 2000 and 2002, the system was further developed to include a placement requirement, meaning that the top two candidates on a list were to be one male and one female, and to include a gender balance of the list as a whole, with the addition of women. Therefore, the Belgian experience demonstrates that the numerical criterion was not enough, because the order of the candidates on the electoral lists was also an important factor influencing the impact of the quota. (Rodríguez Ruiz & Rubio-Marín, 2008, p. 290)
As the Belgian case demonstrated, effective enforcement and sanctions are of paramount importance. . Indeed, its quota system evolved into a 50% quota for electoral lists, including placement rules and sanctions that made it virtually impossible for electoral lists to not comply: lists that did not meet the gender criteria were not allowed to run in elections. Research by Erzeel, Meier and Vandeleene indicates that the strict application of the rules of the quotas was quickly translated into electoral practice while the actual representation of women increased more slowly, partly due to aspects of the electoral system and the role of political parties in the recruitment and selection of candidates. Belgium consequently illustrates how a quota, if properly complemented by concrete placement rules and effective sanctions, can be more than a formal legal instrument, but also a way to remove all institutional barriers to women’s representation, even when the law is suitably enforced (Erzeel et al., 2022, pp. 173 – 174). To bring an example from Central Asian countries, the picture is different when one reviews the interactions between the presence of gender quotas, women’s political representation and women’s participation in political decision-making in Kyrgyzstan.
To support the discussion above, several statutory laws analysis was made including Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic 2021, Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011 and The Law on State Guarantee of Equal Rights and Opportunities of Men and Women No.184, 2011. The Constitution has the highest legal force and direct effect (Art. 6 of Constitution 2021). It prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex (Art. 24(1)), states that men and women have equal rights and equal opportunities to realize them (Art. 24(3)), and guarantees the right to elect, to be elected and to participate in the governance of the state (Art. 37(1)-(2)). Art. 24(1) also states that special measures established by law to ensure equal opportunities are not discrimination, which gives a constitutional basis for gender quotas (Constitution 2021). However, the Constitution does not itself contain a numerical quota, and it leaves the procedure on this issue to be governed by Constitutional Law on Elections (Art. 76(2)). Therefore, the constitutional level provides a guarantee of principle, which is formal equality and permission for quotas, but not an obligation to reach a certain level of women’s representation.
The Constitutional Law No. 68 of 2011 (as amended, most recently in July 2026) turns these principles into concrete rules, and it has higher legal force above other laws based on Art.6(2) of The Law on Normative Legal Acts No.241, 2009. Art. 2(3) of Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011 repeats the principle of equal opportunities, but the operative measures are found in Chapter 11 of Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011. Ninety deputies are elected in 30 three-member districts under a majoritarian system, where each voter chooses one candidate (Arts. 13(2), 59(2), 31(8-1) of Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011). Within this system, three rules apply: political parties must nominate not more than 70 percent of candidates of one sex (Art. 60(11)); not more than two mandates in one district may go to one sex (Art. 64(4)); and at least 30 of the 90 mandates must belong to deputies of one sex (Art. 64(5) of Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011). In addition, a vacant mandate passes to a candidate of the same sex, and a by-election is held only when candidates of both sexes are absent (Arts. 59(9)-(10), 65 of Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011). The Kyrgyz model is therefore not only a candidate quota but also a guarantee of results, which is important because candidate quotas do not always change outcomes. At the same time, some limitations can be identified. The 70 percent rule is placed in the article on party nomination and is not repeated for self-nominated candidates (Art. 60-1 of Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011). The law does not state a specific sanction for violating it, although refusal of registration for non-compliance with the nomination procedure (Art. 61(11)) seems to cover it (Constitutional Law on Elections No.68, 2011). The election deposit is the same for everyone, while the law reduces it for candidates with disabilities but not for women (Arts. 60-1(2), 61(4), 41(9-1)). The text also does not say that the measure is temporary, although The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2011 describes quotas as temporary special measures.
The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2008 (amended in 2026) serves as the general framework. It sets the goals of parity and equality of result (Arts. 1-2), prohibits direct and indirect gender discrimination (Art. 5), and applies the 70 percent limit to the civil service and to appointments made by the President and the Parliament (Arts. 10, 23-24 of The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2008). For elected office, however, Arts. 9 and 11 remain general (The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2011). They guarantee representation through unspecified “mechanisms”, say that the state “may” adopt special measures, and send the details to election legislation (The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2011). As a result, the concrete quota is located in the Constitutional Law on Elections and not in this Law. There is also a difference in terminology: the Law on Equal Rights speaks about “parity”, while the operative threshold in all three acts is 70/30. The hierarchy of laws also helps to read the difference in terminology. If “parity” in Art. 11 of the Law on Equal Rights were read as an operative rule, it would conflict with the 70 percent limit in the Constitutional Law on Elections. However, since the Law on Elections has a higher legal force based on Art. 6(2) of The Law on Normative Legal Acts No.241, 2009, there is no expressed conflict between the mentioned laws. It is therefore more likely that “parity” expresses an aspiration, while 70/30 is the enforceable threshold.
The enforcement provisions include monitoring, gender expertise and civil society oversight (Arts. 7-8, 25-29 of The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2011). In 2026 a complaint procedure and a shifted burden of proof were added (Art. 30), but sanctions for officials are left to other legislation (Art. 34 of The Law on Equal Rights No.184, 2011).
Based on the above discussion, one can conclude there is a constitutional regulation so as other statutory law that secure descriptive representation in parliament fairly firmly. However, both discussed statutes conflict in regulating leadership positions inside parliament, party leadership, financial barriers to candidacy, absences of expressed liability for lack of enforcement. This supports the difference between formal guarantees and substantive equality.Moreover, the effect of quotas depends on their regulatory design and enforcement.
The comparison demonstrates that the existence of gender quotas alone does not determine their effectiveness in increasing women’s meaningful participation in political decision-making. The experience of Belgium shows that candidate quotas became more effective when combined with placement requirements and enforceable sanctions, while the Kyrgyz legal framework provides relatively strong guarantees of women’s descriptive representation through candidate, district and mandate rules. At the same time, the Kyrgyz framework does not fully address substantive equality, including women’s access to leadership positions, party decision-making and financial resources. Therefore, the practical effectiveness of gender quotas should be assessed not only by the number of women elected, but also by the institutional conditions that enable them to exercise genuine political influence. The comparison of European and Central Asian practices thus suggests taking into consideration the design, enforcement and broader political and social context of quotas that are essential to translating formal legal guarantees into substantive political equality.
We thank Samir Mosaver (AUCA LLM Program student) and Aizirek Erkebaeva (AUCA LLM Program student) for their assistance with the research for this article.
