The founding narratives of the USA and the EU differ substantially but that does not mean that an EU-wide understanding of what Hans Kelsen conceptionalized as the so-called basic norm (Grundnorm) is absent. Rather, a European foundational norm has developed in parallel to national ones since 1951. The debate about a more coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) displays that it is time to decide which one has priority. Legally, the CFSP continues to be the prerogative of the Member States. Decisions are primarily made unanimously by the European Council with some exceptions concerning the implementation of these decisions s (Art. 31 TEU). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has no jurisdiction over these provisions (Art. 275 TFEU), except when it comes to safeguarding the legal separation between the Union’s intergovernmental foreign policy and its supranational economic and legislative (Art. 40 TEU).
At the same time, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Hungary’s refusal to support a 90bn EUR loan to Ukraine, Belgium’s disagreement as to how to finance the loan, and the US-American exit from the international liberal order have put the Union’s strategic autonomy high on the agenda ( Politico, 2026). European strategic autonomy does not primarily refer to the federalization or supranationalization of EU foreign policy. Rather, it describes the Union’s ambition to develop the political, military, technological, and economic capacities necessary to pursue its interests independently when required. While France, Germany, Italy, and Spain advocate for institutional reforms such as qualified majority voting to increase the EU’s ability to act (German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023; Politico, 2023), the Union’s approach of strategic autonomy has focused on improving coherence, coordination, and collective action among Member States while balancing European independence and transatlantic cooperation (European External Action Service, 2025; European Parliament, 2025; Strategic Compass, 2022). The incorporation of foreign and security policy into the EU’s supranational order or a European federal state has only been theorized (Duff, 2022; Magnette, 2003; Spinelli et al., 1944).
These thoughts lead to the debates about the founding of the United States of America and the Federalist Papers of 1788 advocating for a federally organized country of one people united under one Constitution. This strong union was to guarantee peace and security (Federalist 2 ff.), which was to serve as the foundation for economic strength and international influence (Federalist 11) – the latter of which the EU seems to be lacking. Could we, then, conclude from reading the Federalist Papers that a stronger European Union requires a harmonized foreign and security policy or at a quicker decision-making process? I argue that the historical contexts of the EU and the US differ and that the discussion about the decision-making of the CFSP is short-sighted. Structural questions concerning voting mechanisms should be the result of substantive considerations. Structure cannot substitute substance. And substance itself requires a European foundational norm (Grundnorm) – in Hans Kelsen’s understanding – for the CFSP to be sustainable.
Founding narratives of the USA and the EU
Contrary to post World-War II Europe, thehe US was a polity in the process of transformation from a confederation that had existed for a relatively short period of time into a federal union. It emerged from the revolutionary period as a new state seeking to overcome the weaknesses of the Confederation through a federal constitutional order. The Constitution established a division of powers between the federal government and the states, created a domestic market free of internal trade barriers, and assigned foreign policy and defense responsibilities to the national level. The Federalist Papers justify this stronger union on the need to coordinate diverse interests in pursuit of a common good for all US citizens (Federalist 45). Federal institutions were designed to reconcile different interests (Federalist 2) and mediate of diversity (Federalist 5), while protecting individual interests, since “the diversity in the faculties of men” made a uniformity of interests impossible, and “the protection of these faculties is the first object of government” (Federalist 10). In that context, a federal army, for example, would ensure respect for international obligations, and prevent individual states from pursuing narrow interests that could lead to unnecessary conflict (Federalist 2, 3, 4). At the same time, Hamilton acknowledged the “insulated situation” (Federalist No. 8), of the United States, suggesting that security concerns were less prominent a concern as they had been during the long history of Europe. All these arguments come together in one underlying narrative: strengthen American independence.
The story of post-World War II European integration is fundamentally the story of an attempt to prevent another World war by containing European nationalisms. Unlike the founding of the US, European integration emerged among fully sovereign states with established governments, diplomatic traditions, and independent foreign policies that had been developed over centuries. The European project was not initially an effort to create a new state, but an attempt to create cooperation between existing states by pooling sovereignty in areas where national competition had repeatedly produced interstate conflict. When the USA was founded, Europe consisted of several competing powers. Historians generally identify Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia as the principal European powers, while Qing China remained the world’s largest economy by aggregate output. Spain and the Ottoman Empire remained significant imperial actors but had declined relative to these rising powers (Bayly, 2003; Black 2002; Brewer, 1989; Maddison 2001; Kennedy 1987; Pomeranz, 2000). But foreign policy in Europe was not limited to great powers. Smaller states, such as Belgium after its independence from the Netherlands in 1830, or Denmark, also pursued distinct foreign policy objectives, including colonial ambitions. European politics therefore developed around a complex balance of competing interests rather than a shared political authority, let alone a European-unifying goal. Yet, ideas of European unity existed throughout this period and even before. Erasmus of Rotterdam’s Complaint of Peace (1517), the Duke of Sully’s Grand Dessein (1638), and Rousseau’s A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe (1782) all envisioned forms of European cooperation. These proposals remained philosophical or normative.
Only after the devastation of two world wars, European unity became a real political project when Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany sought not to replace sovereignty but to constrain its destructive consequences (Monnet, 1978). The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951 pooled national coal and steel production. In 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) laid the foundation for the internal market, which forms the core of the European Union today, comprising the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. To avoid any national ambitions that could provoke a war, the new concept of supranationalism was brought into being: Sovereign Member States delegated political competencies to supranational institutions. The European Commission holds the right to initiate EU legal acts. Although Member States, represented in the Council of Ministers, can agree/change/refuse the Commission’s proposals, they do not have to do so unanimously. A qualified majority (55% of Member States representing at least 65% of the total EU population) is, in most cases, sufficient. The resulting Union’s legal acts are supreme to Member State’s national law (C-6/64) and confer rights on EU citizens who may enforce them before national courts (C-26/62) when sufficiently the European provisions are clear, precise, and unconditional. Notably, the CJEU subsequently extended this doctrine to other forms of EU law, including regulations (C-93/71), directives (with limitations, C-41/74), and decisions (C-9/70), adapting the conditions for direct effect to each legal act. This is the case, even without the existence of implementing legislation from their governments (C-26/62, C-9/70, C-93/17, C-41/74). Financial penalties for Member States’ disobedience can be high. This construct places the EU structurally between an international organization and a state. Neither does a direct effect for international law exist (transposition in national law is required) nor can qualified majority voting override a certain amount of an international organization’s member states in the process of international law creation. The supranational structure reflects the Union’s founding rationale of keeping nationalisms of sovereign states in check.
The EU has never become a state as EU institutions lack the authority to independently determine the scope of its own competences. In a democracy this ability is in the hands of the people, usually by way of parliamentary representation or referenda. Unlike states, whose constitutional orders establish their own powers, the EU derives its competences (and can only act within these powers) from democratically elected governments of sovereign Member States. Thereby, the citizens of EU Member States – and not European citizens – remain at the origin of each Union Treaty. Thus, the EU remains dependent on the governments of its Member States for the allocation of its competencies (Grimm, 2016). This means, among other things, that EU citizenship requires citizenship of a Member State. One needs an identification document of a Member State to be eligible for an EU passport. Different from that, the American federal government receives constitutionally defined powers directly from the American people. This is an important distinction when looking at the topic of foreign policy.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy
In 1952, the European Defense Community (EDC) was an unsuccessful attempt to harmonize the defense policies of ECSC Member States (namely, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany). Originally proposed in the Pleven Plan (1950), a European army was supposed to have a common budget and be governed by supranational institutions and keep in check possible German rearmament plans. It failed in 1954 when the French National Assembly rejected its ratification, concerned over a possible German domination of the EDC, (Gavin, 2009; Mourlon-Druol, n.d.) and fearful of an international disadvantage compared to Great Britain, which would maintain its sovereignty over the military (Leites & de la Malène, 1957). Henceforth, European integration focused on economic and political union while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became the defense structure for ECSC Member States, keeping national sovereignty over the military intact. (NATO was founded by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 1949. West Germany joined in 1955.) This structure also reflected American preferences for NATO as the cornerstone of European security (Hyde-Price, 2007). By that time, establishing a separate European military command would have largely duplicated NATO structures with a questionable additional strategic value. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the political context changed and brought foreign and security policy back onto the European agenda. Economic integration alone was substantially no longer enough. A common substantive political framework became increasingly necessary. The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) established the EU based on general principles and laid the foundations for its largest enlargement in 2004. Czechia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia joined the EU. They represented more than 74 million citizens. This process culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and the consolidation of the Union’s value system in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Since Maastricht’s general principles, the Union’s values have been specified and strengthened (Directive 2020/2092, European Parliament, 2025).
The Treaty of Maastricht also established the CFSP as an intergovernmental framework for coordinating their foreign and security policies while making its actions accountable to the general principles. In 1999 at the Cologne European Council meeting, Member States agreed on the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’ to develop capabilities for military action. Now, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) complements the CFSP by providing mechanisms for crisis response and post-conflict stabilization, such as the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) established in 2017 and Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) in 2025 building on existing national armies. It did not replace national armed forces but addressed gaps in the Union’s capacity to act collectively while Member States’ kept sovereign control over foreign and defense policy. While the deployment of the Rapid Deployment Capacity requires unanimous Council approval, PESCO decisions are generally taken unanimously by the participating Member States, with the Treaties providing for qualified majority voting in certain specific cases under Article 46 TEU. This development shows that form follows function, or, putting the Monnet Method in other words: substance determines structure. The institutional architecture of today’s Union reflects the accumulation of successive political responses to changing political circumstances while the validity of the European project existing and developing in parallel to the continued validity of sovereign states in Europe was never questioned. Is it time to do so?
The power of fish sticks: let’s talk substance (and some structure)
Less reliance on transatlantic cooperation, a worldwide declining commitment to international law, Russia’s threat to international security – with a few exceptions, there seems to be a European-wide consensus on these geopolitical challenges. Which structure will be best suited to respond to these challenges? And what does best exactly mean? I would like to discuss two notions of best: One popular structural consideration, which holds that qualified majority decisions will lead to quicker policy responses within the CFSP. The second one relates more to substance. It assumes that the best decisions are decisions aligning with EU objectives backed by all Members, making CFSP actions more credible. Remember that none of the present efficiency-related proposals demand the supranational organization of the CFSP!
Let’s consider the CFSP decision-making speed: The recent dispute over EU financial assistance for Ukraine’s defense against Russia, in which Hungary temporarily blocked an agreement, illustrates how the current unanimity requirement can delay or even prevent collective action. It can also water down agreements. Just in July 2026, Germany opposed the limitation of fish imports from Russia (Euractiv, 2026). The country has the world’s largest fish stick production sites (Der Tagesspiegel, 2026), which secure 8,000 jobs (NTV, 2026). By the way, this is also the country that has advocated for qualified majority decisions in the policy area concerned (Politico, 2013). The German example, thus, shows how national interests shift. Since when do fish sticks limit our national imagination to such an extent that we cannot even fathom importing the much-needed fish from other countries? Are fish sticks truly more important than our national security?
Extending qualified majority to the CFSP could provide the cure, so the claim. An agreement over financial aid for Ukraine would have come quicker, and Germany’s fish sticks would not have been of interest to anyone. The majority acting in the interest of the EU could have done so much more effectively. But why do we assume that the preferences of the majority will always be geared towards the interests of the Union? In Federalist 3, John Jay claims that representatives on the federal level “will be more temperate and cool.” (Federalist 3). Yet, the attribution of human characteristics to governance levels is risky. The last European Parliament elections have shown that the supranational governance levels can also be affected by a right-wing, anti-European turn (European Parliament, 2024) In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland secured 15.9% in the European elections, making it the second strongest party after the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) (European Parliament, 2024). The party gained ground on all political levels from local to federal to supranational. This European-wide development (Guardian, 2026) translates into politics on the European level, undermining European institutions. The AfD propagates the abolishment of the European Parliament (AfD, 2024). Neither is democratic wisdom linked to the level of governance, nor does nationalism stop at national borders. There is no guarantee that the European Council will always act in the interest of the EU, meaning some policy along the lines of Article 2 TEU.
While qualified majority voting may enable faster decisions, it may also weaken the credibility of a common foreign policy if important decisions are not supported by all Member States. Lengthy deliberation is not per se a sign of institutional weakness; it may instead reflect solid consensus-building. Majority decisions that lack broad political backing may prove less persuasive externally and could encourage third countries to exploit divisions between individual Member States. Most importantly, whether the Union retains its current intergovernmental structure or expands qualified majority voting, both models ultimately reflect the same underlying challenge: the persistent national-supranational competition of interests impedes a coherent European foreign policy that respects Article 2 TEU. The introduction of qualified majority voting cannot resolve this problem. If EU Members seek stronger common structures, they must accept that the European foundational norm, which has developed in parallel to national ones since 1951, must supersede the latter.
A European Grundnorm?
In What is Justice? (1957) Hans Kelsen argued that, although law must be distinguished from morality or value, every legal order depends on a fundamental norm (Grundnorm), which is the supreme, conceptually presupposed basis of legal systems. It is not a written law, but a logical necessity. It confers validity on all other legal norms but does not determine their content. Once a revolution or change of system occurs – for example the introduction of the German Basic Law in 1949 or the ECSC in 1951 – the Grundnorm changes. In the EU, the Treaties occupy a comparable position insofar as a Union dimension was added to Member States’ national fundamental norms, both resting on the presupposition that they ought to be observed and, both were not assumed to be at odds. In the same vein, the Grundnorm for the former communist states changed nationally and was also added a European dimension after 1989. In short: a supranational Grundnorm developed in parallel to national fundamental norms in all EU Member States. This development is reflected in the ambiguous structure of the CFSP. Neither the currently dominating intergovernmental structure nor qualified majority voting would be sufficient to overcome this ambivalent logic and, therefore, lead to an unreliable foreign policy. Credibility in foreign relations comprises more than volatile actions in the international realm. It needs a Grundnorm to convey commitment, and it needs the Article 2 values to result in domestic and international substantial acceptance. Article 2 TEU establishes the subsequent normative commitments and political dos and don’ts. Therefore, a coherent and credible foreign policy is a function of the sustained commitment to the Union’s Grundnorm and values. Both already exist. Thus, EU Member States might be ready to take the next small step in the history of the Monnet Method and create the Federation of Europe.
